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I. INTRODUCTION
Catharine MacKinnon's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State' is a pro-
vocative challenge to both conceptions of liberal jurisprudence and to the tradi-
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tional Marxist critique of liberalism. Each stands accused of erasing the centrali-
ty of gender, sex, and sexuality in the development of a modern legal system.
This erasure, MacKinnon believes, can only perpetuate injustice at its base
through the pretense that equality has already been achieved-as in the case
of her version of liberalism-or reduce it to a category of class domination
which makes gender a secondary form of subordination-as in the case of her
interpretation of Marxism. Before turning to my critique of MacKinnon, I want
to pay her the tribute she clearly deserves for her relentless insistence that any
theory of equality for women will fall short of its own aspirations if it neglects
the question of how sexual identity, and more specifically femininity, is con-
structed through a gender hierarchy in which women are subordinated and
subjected. I share her insistence that we cannot begin to conceptualize a theory
of equality that truly envisions the end of female domination without confront-
ing the relationship between sex and sexuality as these have become constitu-
tive of the gender identity imposed upon women by patriarchy. Her contribution
has not been merely to criticize existing theories; she has been a proponent of
specific doctrinal changes and played a key role, for example, in justifying the
recognition of sexual harassment as a matter of sex discrimination and gender
inequality.2 This is one of many examples of how her understanding of the
constitutive role of sexuality in the creation and perpetuation of male domi-
nance has led to advocacy for legal and doctrinal reform.
My critique of MacKinnon, however, is that ultimately she does not fully
develop her program, which attempts to justify positive intervention by the state
into current social arrangements of gender hierarchy and identity. I will argue
that she cannot successfully develop her own feminist theory of the state
because she is unable to affirm feminine sexual difference as other than victim-
ization.3 Of course, we need a program that legally delegitimates the gender
hierarchy and exposes the seriousness of sexual abuse. But we also need a more
expansive, positive program, for the reduction of feminine sexual difference
to victimization ultimately cannot sustain a feminist theory of the state. I
propose a program which recognizes and incorporates equivalent rights.4 Such
a program would be irreducible to an intermediary set of privileges like affirma-
2. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE WORKING WOMAN: A CASE OF WORKING
WOMEN (1979); see also Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (argued by Catharine
MacKinnon).
3. Other writers have voiced similar concerns and have noted the way in which MacKinnon not only
disparages women's sexuality but also how she portrays it in such a way as to increase the very problem
of sexual abuse that she so desperately seeks to correct. See, e.g., Schroeder, Feminism Historicized:
Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA L. REV 1135 (1990);
J. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
4. I first developed this concept of equivalent rights in Sex Discrimination Law and Equivalent Rights,
published as Gender, Sex and Equivalent Rights, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL (J. Butler & 3.
Scott eds. 1991).
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tive action-as important as these steps may be5-and would go beyond
addressing inequality in the name of making it possible for women to be more
like men.
I do not deny the horror and the reality of the story MacKinnon tells us
about the extent to which sexual abuse perpetuated against women gets taken
as the way of the world,6 but I do want to argue against the reduction of
woman to the figure of the victim. The result of this reduction is not only that
MacKinnon cannot develop useful programs of reform, but that she cannot
account for the very feminist point of view that she argues must be incorporated
if we are to reach for a state in which equality between the sexes would be
more than mere pretense for the perpetuation of masculine privilege and female
subordination.
Equivalent rights, although meant to challenge gender hierarchy, do not do
so by erasing sexual difference. Further, equivalent rights should not be under-
stood as only a means to the end of sexual difference. Instead, a program of
equivalent rights seeks to value the specificity of feminine7 sexual difference.
MacKinnon cannot take us beyond a "negative" program without the affirma-
tion of the feminine difference which is irreducible to the current patriarchal
trappings of her own understanding of femininity.
Crucial to my disagreement with MacKinnon is her reading of women's
sexuality as constituted only by and for men and, therefore, as contrary to
women's freedom from the chains of an imposed femininity, a femininity which
constitutes "our" sex and that can only justify women's domination.' Thus,
even if I agree with her that rape, battery, sexual abuse, and pornography must
be seen not only as questions of criminal law but as barriers to the equality of
women where the law has the ideological capacity to reinforce the devaluation
of the feminine "sex," I disagree with her structural analysis of feminine sexual
difference and of feminine sexuality. As I already have indicated, it is not
5. While affirmative action is inadequate to address the inequalities that a program of equivalent rights
can, as I will argue, remedy, it nevertheless remains an important means to address broad notions of
inequality. For a comprehensive discussion of affirmative action programs as they relate to women's issues,
see M. ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE 197-204 (1991).
6. P. 127 n.2; C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 5-6 (1987)
[hereinafter C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED].
7. The term feminine is normally used in a pejorative sense in feminist circles to refer to societally
constructed notions of the ideal woman. Here, I use it as an imaginative, universal, irreducible to any
conception or empirical designation of the characteristics of actual women. In this sense, the feminine is
separated from both sociological knowledge of women as objects of study and from conventional, popular
notions of what the "feminine woman" should be.
8. Because MacKinnon conflates sex, sexuality, and gender identity, she can speak of a simple division
between men and women and the masculine and the feminine in a way that I do not accept. Because this
conflation is an impossibility for me, I would not speak so simply of the "us" and the "them" as MacKinnon
does. This does not mean that I deny specificity of feminine sexual difference-far from it. But I do argue
against the us/them dichotomy as a material unshakable reality. See generally D. CORNELL, BEYOND
ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION AND THE LAW (forthcoming 1991) [hereinafter
D. CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION]; Cornell & Thurschwell, Feminism, Negativity, Intersubjectivity,
in FEMINISM AS CRmQIUE: ON THE POLITICS OF GENDER 143 (S. Benhabib & D. Cornell eds. 1987).
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simply that MacKinnon's analysis cannot sustain a positive program for inter-
vention on the part of the state into gender arrangements. MacKinnon's own
stance toward the feminine reflects the very "sexual shame"9 of women's "sex"
that keeps the feminine from being valued and, more specifically, legally
affirmed in a program of equivalent rights. My criticism of the division she
creates between freedom and sexuality assumes a conception of the self as a
being of the flesh, in which sexual expression cannot be easily separated from
freedom.10 For women, the concept of freedom cannot be separated from the
struggle against the devalorization of the feminine. Consciousness-raising,
essential to fostering the dream of women's freedom, involves more than the
exposure of the "truth" of our victimization. It demands the re-figuration of
what has been constituted "to be" within patriarchy. It also demands that we
think through the conditions of women's equality of well-being and capability
in light of the recognition and value of feminine sexual differences.
Simply put, I will argue that women's sexuality cannot be reduced to
women's "sex," as sex has been currently defined, once we understand both
the limit to institutionalized meaning and the possibility of re-metaphorization
which inheres in the rule of metaphor." MacKinnon's understanding of femi-
nine sexuality accepts what Irigaray has called the "old dream of symmetry."1 2
Irigaray uses the concept of symmetry to explain the masculine fantasy that our
sexuality is symmetrical to that of men. In other words, what men fantasize
women want is what they want us to want. In fact, women's sexuality is
irreducible to the fantasy that we are only "fuckees." MacKinnon's reduction
of feminine sexuality to being a "fuckee" endorses this fantasy as "truth" and
thereby promotes the prohibition against the exploration of women's sexuality
and "sex" as we live it and not as men fantasize about it.
Men, defined by MacKinnon as sexual beings, may imagine that what they
think women want, what they want women to desire, is what women desire.
However, feminine writing on feminine sexuality has recognized the "old dream
of symmetry" as just that: a dream and, more specifically, a masculine dream.
I want to emphasize the political and personal significance for women of
challenging MacKinnon's view of feminine sexuality. The possibility of cele-
brating women's "sex" and sexuality can keep us from the tragic disjuncture
between sex, sexuality, and freedom that MacKinnon's analysis leads us to.
In terms of a theory of equality, her critique cannot meet its own aspiration
to legitimate and recognize the feminine point of view in law in the name of
equality and not by appeal to special privilege. Her analysis cannot achieve this
9. For an analysis of sexual shame in women, see Galenson & Roiphe, The Impact of Early Sexual
Discovery on Mood, Defensive Organization, and Symbolization, 26 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE
CHILD 195 (1972).
10. See Pp. 153-54.
11. See Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for
Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1988).
12. See L. IRIGARAY, SPECULUM OF THE OTHER WOMAN 11-129 (G. Gill trans. 1985).
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if it denies the equivalent value of the two sexes. Equivalent rights do not
repeat the "separate but equal" argument, but challenge the idea that sexual
difference can or should be eradicated through the pretense that the human race
is currently constituted as sex-neutral, or as if man is the equivalent of human.
The view of equality I rely on to justify my understanding is Amartya Sen's
equality of capability and well-being. 3 As Sen reminds us, "[c]apability re-
flects a person's freedom to choose between different ways of living." 4 Sen's
view of equality is valuable to feminists precisely because it allows for a
"4positive" program to guarantee women's equality of well-being and capability.
Capability of well-being implies the affirmation of sex and sexuality and, in
the case of women more specifically, of living without shame of our sex.
II. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTON OF WOMEN'S SEXUALITY
Let me begin with MacKinnon's analysis of the social construction of
femininity as an expression of male dominance and, more specifically, of male
sexual desire. To quote MacKinnon: "Male dominance is sexual. Meaning: men
in particular, if not men alone, sexualize hierarchy; gender is one. As much a
sexual theory of gender as a gendered theory of sex, this is the theory of
sexuality that has grown out of consciousness raising."'15 Thus, for
MacKinnon, inequality is sexual, and sexuality and the engagement in "sex"
perpetuates that inequality. An analysis of inequality that does not focus on
inequality as a sexual dynamic in which male domination reduces women to
their sex will ultimately "limit feminism to correcting sex bias by acting in
theory as if male power did not exist in fact."' 6 It will "limit feminist theory
the way sexism limits women's lives: to a response to terms men set."1 7 As
a result, MacKinnon argues:
A distinctively feminist theory conceptualizes social reality, including
sexual reality, on its own terms. The question is, what are they? If
women have been substantially deprived not only of their own experi-
ence but of terms of their own in which to view it, then a feminist
theory of sexuality which seeks to understand women's situation in
order to change it must first identify and criticize the construct "sexuali-
ty" as a construct that has circumscribed and defined experience as well
as theory. This requires capturing it in the world, in its situated social
meanings, as it is being constructed in life on a daily basis.'"
13. See A. Sen, Inequality Reexamined: Capability and Well-Being 5-6 (paper delivered at Conference
on Quality of Life, Helsinki, Fin. July 1988, on file with author).
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The study of the construct of sexuality is, for MacKinnon, the examination of
how women come to have a "sex." Women are, very simply put, defined as
women because "we get fucked."
First sexual intercourse is a commonly definitive experience of gender
definition. For many women, it is a rape. It may occur in the family,
instigated by a father or older brother who decided to "make a lady out
of my sister." Women's sex/gender initiation may be abrupt and
anomic: "When she was 15 she had an affair with a painter. He fucked
her and she became a woman." Simone de Beauvoir implied a similar
point when she said: "It is at her first abortion that a woman begins to
'know."' What women learn in order to "have sex," in order to "be-
come women"--women as gender-comes through the experience of,
and is a condition for, "having sex"--woman as sexual object for man,
the use of women's sexuality by men. Indeed, to the extent sexuality
is social, women's sexuality is its use, just as femaleness is its
alterity1
Femininity is the sex imposed on us by a world of male power in which men
seek the fulfillment of their desire through us. Feminine gender identity is this
imposed sexuality, reinforced in all gendered social arrangements and through
the state, which reflects male sexual desire and legitimates sexual dominance
as the rule of law. The challenge then to femininity as imposed sexuality, as
the subjection of our "selves" to our "sex," is feminism, and ultimately this
forms the basis of the feminist theory of the state.
In feminist terms, the fact that male power has power means that the
interests of male sexuality construct what sexuality as such means,
including the standard way it is allowed and recognized to be felt and
expressed and experienced, in a way that determines women's biogra-
phies, including sexual ones. Existing theories, until they grasp this, will
not only misattribute what they call female sexuality to women as such,
as if it were not imposed on women daily; they will also participate in
enforcing hegemony of the social construct "desire," hence its product,
"sexuality," hence its construct "woman," on the world.
The gender issue, in this analysis, becomes the issue of what is
taken to be "sexuality"; what sex means and what is meant by sex,
when, how, with whom, and with what consequences to whom.2°
"Sex" difference is the consequence of this imposed sexuality. To celebrate
women's difference is a form of "false consciousness," because women's so-
called difference is only women's lives as "fuckees," and the affirmation of
difference is only an excuse for reducing women to those who "get fucked"
in whatever way men want to do it to us. This reduction of women to "fuck-
19. P. 111 (citations omitted).
20. P. 129.
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ees" is what MacKinnon means when she argues that our social reality is
fundamentally pornographic.
We can now begin to understand why, according to MacKinnon, pornogra-
phy is absolutely central to the way in which the state enforces the male
viewpoint and particularly the male vision of women as sexual objects. The
representation of having men forced down women's throats is not just men's
masturbatory fantasy but the truth of women's reality. Deep Throat, in other
words, gives us a depiction of what we are forced to become under our current
system of gender domination. This is why MacKinnon can say in all serious-
ness that we are all Linda Lovelace,21 with oral sex being the essence of
women's subordination.
Yet this reality of subordination is not only ignored by the state, it is
protected as a matter of right-the right of free speech under the First Amend-
ment.' Pornography, for MacKinnon, is not a matter of speech at all, but a
matter of the systematic silencing of women. The image of men being shoved
down women's throats is the very symbol of shutting us up.
Thus the question Freud never asked is the question that defines sexuali-
ty in a feminist perspective: what do men want? Pornography provides
an answer. Pornography permits men to have whatever they want
sexually. It is their "truth about sex." It connects the centrality of visual
objectification to both male sexual arousal and male models of knowl-
edge and verification, objectivity with objectification. It shows how men
see the world, how in seeing it they access and possess it, and how this
is an act of dominance over it. It shows what men want and gives it to
them. From the testimony of the pornography, what men want is:
women bound, women battered, women tortured, women humiliated,
women degraded and defiled, women killed. Or, to be fair to the soft
core, women sexually accessible, have-able, there for them, wanting to
be taken and used, with perhaps just a little light bondage. Each viola-
tion of women-rape, battery, prostitution, child sexual abuse, sexual
harassment-is made sexuality, made sexy, fun, and liberating of
women's true nature in the pornography.23
That pornography is seen as the "right to speak" is another sign of the way in
which the state and the law simply reflect the male point of view and the right
of men to subordinate women to their sexual desires. As MacKinnon explains:
The state is male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women
the way men see and treat women. The liberal state coercively and
authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a
gender-through its legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and
21. See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 127, 129.
22. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech...." U.S. CONST. amend. I
23. P. 138 (footnote omitted).
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substantive policies. The state's formal norms recapitulate the male
point of view on the level of design.' 4
The feminist point of view, on the other hand, is impossible, because,
according to MacKinnon, the male "point of view" enforces itself as true and
as the totality of a pornographic social reality. As MacKinnon tells us:
Feminism criticizes this male totality without an account of women's
capacity to do so or to imagine or realize a more whole truth. Feminism
affirms women's point of view, in large part, by revealing, criticizing,
and explaining its impossibility. This is not a dialectical paradox. It is
a methodological expression of women's situation, in which the struggle
for consciousness is a struggle for world: for a sexuality, a history, a
culture, a community, a form of power, an experience of the sacred.z5
For MacKinnon, the impossibility of a woman's point of view is constantly
reinforced by the state, which reflects the male point of view as the rule of law
and which erases what it has done in the name of neutrality. The rule of law
is then transformed into ideology, further enforcing the male viewpoint not just
as perspective but as the definitive interpretation of the Constitution.
III. MACKINNON'S MARXISM SUMMARIZED
We can now turn to MacKinnon's unique transposition of the Marxist
critique into her analysis of imposed sexuality as the basis of feminine gender
identity.26 For MacKinnon, law is clearly not neutral vis-A-vis the gender
divide. Instead, law reinforces the legitimacy of the male viewpoint as the
standard upon which the law is based and is bolstered by the myth of the legal
person. The myth of the legal person erases the continuing reality of the gender
hierarchy and the terrible suffering imposed by male domination. By so doing,
the myth is itself a form of domination. The Marxist application here turns on
MacKinnon's argument that the liberal state is based on a pretense of gender
equality in the name of a legal person when, in reality, the underlying social
stratum of gender inequality remains as the truth of woman's condition. It is
precisely in its perpetuation of the myth of equality as a reality that the liberal
state further silences women who try to challenge it as a reflection of its
masculine constitution. For this is exactly what our Constitution is for
MacKinnon: the protection of the right of men to silence and to subordinate
women. The so-called abstract equality of the individual must, therefore, be
24. Pp. 161-62 (footnote omitted).
25. P. 115.
26. MacKinnon first developed this Marxist critique in a two-part essay published as Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982) and Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983).
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challenged by feminism. This is one interpretation of a Marxist analysis trans-
posed into the context of gender. As Marx argued that the establishment of
bourgeois rights hides the continuing reality of class subordination, so
MacKinnon argues that the constitution of "the rights of man" erases the
subordination of women as the basis of social life.
In Anglo-American jurisprudence, morals (value judgments) are deemed
separable and separated from politics (power contests), and both from
adjudication (interpretation). Neutrality, including judicial decision
making that is dispassionate, impersonal, disinterested, and precedential,
is considered desirable and descriptive. Courts, forums without predis-
position among parties and with no interest of their own, reflect society
back to itself resolved. Government of laws, not of men, limits partiality
with written constraints and tempers force with reasonable rule-follow-
ing.27
As a result, MacKinnon identifies the so-called neutrality of the liberal state
not only as a prop to the male point of view but as its fundamental expression.
Thus, she can argue that
[t]he state is male jurisprudentially, meaning that it adopts the stand-
point of male power on the relation between law and society. This
stance is especially vivid in constitutional adjudication, thought legiti-
mate to the degree it is neutral on the policy content of legislation. The
foundation for its neutrality is the pervasive assumption that conditions
that pertain among men on the basis of gender apply to women as
well-that is, the assumption that sex inequality does not really exist
in society. The Constitution-the constituting document of this state
society-with its interpretations assumes that society, absent government
intervention, is free and equal; that its laws, in general, reflect that; and
that government need and should right only what government has
previously wronged. This posture is structural to a constitution of
abstinence: for example, "Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of... speech." Those who have freedoms like equality, liberty,
privacy, and speech socially keep them legally, free of governmental
intrusion. No one who does not already have them socially is granted
them legally.
Before turning to my own story of the constitution of feminine "sex,"
sexuality, and gender difference, which I will use to counter MacKinnon, I want
to demonstrate some of the contradictions within her analysis.
27. P. 162 (footnote omitted).
28. P. 163.
1991] 2255
The Yale Law Journal
IV. THE CONTRADICTIONS INHERENT IN MACKINNON'S
DEVALUATION OF THE FEMININE
The first and most important criticism is that MacKinnon is mistaken when
she says that it does not matter whether and how the feminine sex is affirmed
or disparaged. As she puts it:
Difference is the velvet glove on the iron fist of domination. The
problem then is not that differences are not valued; the problem is that
they are defined by power. This is as true when difference is affirmed
as when it is denied, when its substance is applauded or disparaged,
when women are punished or protected in its name.2 9
In MacKinnon's own terms, this difference matters precisely in relation to
what it might mean to incorporate the feminist point of view into the
state-MacKinnon's stated program.
Law that does not dominate life is as difficult to envision as a society
in which men do not dominate women, and for the same reasons. To
the extent feminist law embodies women's point of view, it will be said
that its law is not neutral. But existing law is not neutral. It will be said
that it undermines the legitimacy of the legal system. But the legitimacy
of existing law is based on force at women's expense. Women have
never consented to its rule-suggesting that the system's legitimacy
needs repair that women are in a position to provide."
How can one incorporate the feminist point of view into the state if sexual
difference is not recognized? More specifically, in MacKinnon's own terms,
how could women provide the needed repair? If women as a gender are defined
as victims, as fuckees, as voiceless, and if, as MacKinnon argues, the feminist
"point of view" is an impossibility within our system of male dominance, then
it would be impossible to provide the condition for repair. Thus, women,
defined as we are by MacKinnon, cannot possibly play the role she allots to
them.
The second contradiction in MacKinnon's analysis is that she advocates a
positive program of state intervention into gender arrangements, and yet her
own political slogan, "Out now!," is, and must remain, negative. Positive rights
for women should not just involve the end of sexual abuse or even restrictions
on pornography. MacKinnon has advocated and successfully fought to pass a
city ordinance that makes the propagation of pornography actionable as a matter
of sex inequality. In Virginia v. American Bookseller Association, Inc.,"1 the
29. P. 219.
30. P. 249.
31. 488 U.S. 905 (1988).
2256 [Vol. 100: 2247
Sexual Difference
harm to women was recognized by the Court, yet pornography was protected
as speech. As she has argued, the "law of the First Amendment secures free-
dom of speech only from governmental deprivation. 3 2 For MacKinnon, the
limit on governmental intervention not only applies to the First Amendment,
but also to the concept of law. As a result, we do not have what MacKinnon
calls a "negative" state, but rather a social reality which guarantees the positive
"freedom" of women precisely through the limit on state intervention. MacKin-
non argues that "the offspring of proper passivity is substanceless. Law produc-
es its progeny immaculately, without messy political intercourse."33
I agree with MacKinnon that the harm to women caused by pornography
should be legally recognized, even if I do not accept her own legal solution.
But my point here is that without the affirmation of femininity we cannot
develop a concept of "positive" freedom for women which MacKinnon herself
recognizes we need to rectify the inequality of women. As MacKinnon herself
has said, the negative state has specific implications: "For women this has
meant that civil society, the domain in which women are distinctively subordi-
nated and deprived of power has been placed beyond reach of legal guaran-
tees. ' 3M But if we are to truly intervene in civil society to restructure the
gender hierarchy, we must legally insist that the specificity of feminine sexual
difference be valued. MacKinnon's analysis, in other words, can criticize the
negative state, but she cannot successfully justify the move beyond it given her
own repudiation of the feminine. I agree with her, however, that the negative
state is not enough to end the inequality of women.
We need a full program of rights that will provide women with the condi-
tions for equality of well-being and capability. I advocate Sen's theory of
equality for two reasons. First, the emphasis on well-being allows us to take
sexuality and its expression into consideration when thinking about equality for
women. Second, such a view of equality allows for "positive" legal intervention
on the part of the state to guarantee "well-being." In other words, this view of
equality allows us to move beyond the negative state that MacKinnon describes
as inadequate to provide equality for women. Equality of well-being and
capability also prevents the recognition of sexual difference from degenerating
into the justification of special privilege for women. Equivalent rights are neces-
sary for equality. They should not be seen as special privileges. This vision of
equality has the substance that allows for positive intervention and does more
than just perpetuate stereotypes. The rhetoric that fits equivalent rights into a
view of equality is important because, in the end, the rhetoric provides us not
only with philosophical justification for the conditions of women's equal well-
being, but also provides a cultural framework in which recognition of feminine
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To summarize, MacKinnon's refusal to affirm feminine sexual difference
means that her negative political program cannot be turned into "positive"
affirmative legal reform. Her example of Nicaragua, in Feminism Unmodi-
fied,35 does not provide a blueprint for a legal program for women. The Nica-
raguans were fighting for socialism and for national independence. They were
not fighting to keep the United States out, but to realize a dream of a different
social order. The slogan "Out now!" was addressed to a nation that was inter-
vening against that dream and against that fight. If our dream is to recognize
women as full human beings, then the negative program MacKinnon offers is
not and cannot be enough.
V. THE CRITIQUE OF MACKINNON'S CONCEPTION OF LIBERALISM
MacKinnon's analysis of liberalism is limited to a conception of neutrality
that even many liberal thinkers reject. Thinkers as diverse as Bruce Ackerman,
C. Edwin Baker, Ronald Dworkin, Sylvia Law, Thomas Nagel, John Rawls,
Steven Shiffrin, and Wendy Williams,36 all of whom would continue to desig-
nate themselves as liberals, have long since abandoned the traditional concept
of neutrality defined by Robert Bork and Herbert Wechsler.37 However, I do
agree that none of these scholars have adequately addressed the significance
of the gender hierarchy as it continues to limit our thinking on equality. This
is important because even within their own terms of analysis it would be
possible to reach very different conclusions on, for example, the question of
pornography. At the very least, I believe this disjuncture between argument and
conclusion is more than a coincidence. Indeed, this disjuncture is itself a
reflection of the devalorization of the feminine that I describe in the second half
of this review.38 I am suggesting, in other words, that the feminist argument,
regardless of how one ultimately comes out on the difficult question of legal
censorship, is not given the weight it deserves because the harm to women is
taken lightly if it is seen at all. To see the harm to women as relevant to a
theory of equality, we do need an account of the relationship of inequality, the
gender hierarchy, and the feminine "sex." Rae Langton, for example, has
argued that Ronald Dworkin's own principles, as he has developed them most
recently in Law's Empire, could be used to justify at least some limited time
35. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 6, at 219.
36. See generally B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); R. DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE (1986); T. NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (forthcoming 1990); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971); S. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990); Baker,
Neutrality, Process and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029
(1980); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Williams, Equality's
Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment-Special Treatment Debate, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
325 (1985).
37. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IN. L.J. 1 (1971);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
38. See infra Parts VII.B and VII.C.
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and place restrictions on pornography.39 On the other hand, Thomas Nagel's
understanding of an "offense" and his argument for reasonableness within the
context of a much more traditional legal argument about "free" speech makes
us question whether some restrictions on pornography could be justified.
But let me first give an account of the relationship between the feminine
and sexual shame, which I develop later,4 which ultimately helps us to under-
stand pornography as an "offense," broadly conceived, against women. Pornog-
raphy is an offense to women because it is inescapable and it is in public. Do
I have the choice to make pornography none of my business? Not if I choose
to go out of my apartment in New York City. I cannot escape the image of the
devalorization of my "sex," which appears everywhere, including the supermar-
ket where I shop, the public transportation I ride, and wherever I might choose
to buy my Coca-Cola. I also understand the serious nature of censorship,
particularly as it is now being used to shut down artistic ventures that them-
selves challenge, on the stage or in other forms of performance art, the very
sexual violence that MacKinnon wants to expose.
Nagel's concept of reasonableness is helpful in examining the legitimacy
of some time and place restrictions on pornography. His theory is important
because we need a concept of legal legitimacy. Without such a concept, we are
left with random balancing devoid of standards. It is essential to explain why
and how we recognize not only the way pornography harms women, but also
why that harm can justify time and place restrictions on pornography. This
"weighing" process demands a guiding principle as to how to proceed in the
social field of profound neglect. Nagel's reasonableness gives us such direction;
he gives us standards by which judges can assess "competing" harms and
viewpoints under which harm is defined.
Under Nagel's theory, we weigh the extent of the wrong and the degree of
the suffering of competing parties having different moral positions against one
another. For example, who is wronged more profoundly and suffers more
intensely-the homosexual who is repressed or the puritan who believes that
homosexuality is an evil that contaminates the puritan's social reality, his
children's well-being, etc?"1 This conception of reasonableness allows the law
39. Langton, Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 311
(1990).
40. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
41. Nagel argues that:
[T]he argument for a liberal solution, which gives the second answer, has to depend on the
judgment that it is terrible to have one's desired form of sexual expression restricted by others
who find it repellent, as part of their own strong sexual feelings. The suppression of homosexuali-
ty is so much worse for the homosexual than is the relaxation of ambient taboos and restrictions
for the sexual puritan, that even the puritan should decide in favor of freedom unless he is
prepared to claim that no legitimate state need consider the potential objections of homosexuals
because homosexuality is wicked and worthy of suppression for its own sake. This, however, is
not a position that no one could reasonably reject, and the puritan is simply mistaken if he thinks
it is.
T. NAGEL, THE ViEw FROM NOWHERE 200 (1986).
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and the state to make the difficult decisions between competing moral and
ethical positions when there is not only no moral consensus, but a "war"
between different moral visions and different perspectives on life in which these
visions are embedded. I am arguing here that the feminist position, particularly
on the issue of pornography, deserves more of a hearing than Nagel himself
has given it.42 I also want to call attention to how Thomas Nagel's own "view
from nowhere,"'43 in which he urges us to overcome our perspective on the
world in the name of the "uncontaminated" nowhere, leads us to what I would
call "compassion." It is interesting to note that Nagel fails to show the same
compassion for the feminist argument against pornography as he does for the
homosexual's argument for freedom of sexual expression. I would argue that
his reason for this "blindness" is Nagel's inability to see the harm to women,
precisely because he does not integrate a psychoanalytic theory of the construc-
tion of feminine sexual difference into his analysis of pornography.
By pornography, and I am adopting Cass Sunstein's definition here,44 I
mean the explicit connection of sex with violence that in no way denies that
pornography is sexual and not just violence. Why am I adopting Cass Sun-
stein's definition? Sunstein's definition allows us to distinguish between erotica
and pornography. We have to think about which definition we adopt within the
context of our political times. The National Endowment of the Arts' campaign
to repress certain forms of erotic expression has now become only too well-
known. Ironically, this censorship has been directed against feminist artistic
attempts to expose and then to critique the reduction of women to sexual
objects as masculine desire. Thus, I adopt Sunstein's definition because it
allows us to distinguish between erotica and pornography, and because it
protects feminist artists who may choose to graphically depict women's sexual
objectification in such a way as to themselves fall victim to censorship. But
even if one adopts Sunstein's definition, his own argument for certain time and
place restrictions on pornography lacks a crucial philosophical dimension.
Sunstein's argument is strengthened in defense of the possible legitimation
of time and place restrictions, if he works within Nagel's concept of reasonable-
ness. Indeed, the weakness of Sunstein's own argument is that he does not have
a concept of legal legitimacy. Nagel's reasonableness can provide him with
such a concept. Sunstein argues that the periphery of pornography within the
traditional context of First Amendment arguments, combined with evidence that
pornography promotes violence in men, might lead us to accept legal restric-
42. In the case of the homosexual, Nagel argues that "[the freedom to act on these desires is therefore
a leading candidate for protection as a right." Id. at 200-01. On the other hand, in the case of pornography,
he states, "[t]his does not exclude prohibitions against acute and direct offense to the equally deep sensibili-
ties of others; but it does mean that personal and private activities (including the consumption of pornogra-
phy) should be protected from political control." Id. at 201.
43. Id.
44. C. Sunstein, Neutrality and Constitutionality with Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and
Surrogacy (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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tions, notwithstanding the concern with censorship and the constraints such
restrictions must place on men in their access to pornography. Sunstein ex-
plains:
[T]here is a quite straightforward argument for regulating at least some
pornographic materials. The first point is that much pornographic
material lies far from the center of the first amendment concern. If the
first amendment is, broadly speaking, a safeguard against governmental
suppression of points of view with respect to public affairs, at least
some forms of pornography are far from the core of constitutional
concern. Under current doctrine, and under any sensible system of free
expression, speech that lies at the periphery of constitutional concern
may be regulated on the basis of a lesser showing of government
interest than speech that lies at the core.
To say this is hardly to say that the definition of the core and the
periphery will be simple. Under nearly any standard, however, at least
some pornographic materials will be easily classified as belonging in
the periphery.4 5
If, under traditional doctrinal analysis, pornography is at the periphery of free
speech and there is evidence that it perpetuates the legitimation of violence
against women, while "suffering" to the pornography reader is limited, particu-
larly if access is restricted and not banned, then "reasonableness" may demand
time and place restrictions even before we have an adequate account of the
relationship between gender hierarchy and the devalorization of the feminine
"sex." This account is ultimately necessary if we are to justify the tip in the
balance toward such restrictions.
VI. MACKINNON'S CRITIQUE OF MARXISM IN THE CONTEXT OF GENDER
I have critiqued MacKinnon for her identification of liberalism with princi-
ples of neutrality and for her failure to see that there are liberal arguments for
some of the legal reforms she seeks to make. In this difficult period, we need
to choose our allies carefully. But there is, perhaps, a more important critique
to be made of her own transposition of Marxism into the context of gender. I
agree with her that the Marxist tradition has tended to reduce gender and sex
to a secondary question. And I agree with MacKinnon, as so many others have,
45. Id. at 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
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that this reduction is a disservice to women." Yet I still believe MacKinnon's
own use of Marxism can be critiqued on three separate grounds.
The first is related to the "pragmatic"'47 and "postmodern'" critique of
any attempt to develop an empiricist, positivist, or materialist account of wom-
en's situation that could claim, in any strong sense, to be scientific, if by
scientific we mean "free" of the mediation of narration.49 MacKinnon does
not recognize the status of her own analysis as a story, but rather as a material-
ist conceptualization of gender inequality. Such accounts are never just descrip-
tions, but are always narrations that give meaning to reality. They can never
be free of an evaluation of that reality, which is what gives the story its mean-
ing and, in the case of law, its legal meaning. A classic example is "date rape."
In order to define a certain kind of sexual abuse to women as date rape, we
have to rely on a seeming oxymoron: putting the idea of date-with its implied
concept of consent-together with rape. The behavior may have always been
there, but it took a different story, with a different evaluation of those
acts-such as locking a woman into a dorm room until she agreed to have
sex-to define this behavior as rape.
To say that the philosophical status of MacKinnon's account is a narration
in no way takes away from its "truth," if one means by truth an illumination
of an existing "reality" that previously was invisible, because it had not been
told or evaluated in a way that made that particular behavior "appear" as a
wrong or harm to women within our legal system.50 MacKinnon's story helps
us to see that what was once thought of as normal was and remains the system-
atic sexual abuse of women. I do not disagree with that part of the story which
emphasizes the "normalcy" of sexual violence to women as a physical reality.
The story tells us why it is abuse, and not just "boys being boys. 51 As one
of the many reflected in the unfortunate statistic that at least one-half of all
women will undergo a sexual assault,52 I cannot deny this story myself. Hav-
ing survived an attempted rape, I know only too well the "truth" of
MacKinnon's chapter on rape where she discusses the long-term trauma that
46. As Luce Irigaray puts it:
How can the double demand-for both equality and difference-be articulated? Certainly not by
acceptance of a choice between "class struggle" and "sexual warfare," an alternative that aims
once again to minimize the question of the exploitation of women through a definition of power
of the masculine type. More precisely, it implies putting off to an indefinite later date a women's
"politics," a politics that would be modeled rather too simplistically on men's struggles.
L. IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH Is NOT ONE 81-82 (C. Porter trans. 1985).
47. See R. RoRTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 357-94 (1979).
48. J. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990).
49. This basic Hegelian insight has been the basis of what are now called either pragmatic or
postmodern critiques of scientism. See G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 147-213 (. Baillie trans.
1967).
50. See, e.g., . LYOTARD, THE DIFFERENT: PHRASES IN DISPUTE (G. Van Abbeele trans. 1988).
51. See, e.g., Barrett, Date Rape-A Campus Epidemic?, Ms., Sept. 1982, at 48, 50.
52. MacKinnon explains that "[a]Imost half of all women ... are raped or victims of attempted rape
at least once in their lives. Almost 40 percent are victims of sexual abuse in childhood." P. 176.
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such attacks leave in their wake. But her story is limited precisely because she
figures women only as victims and feminine sexual difference as only "the
velvet glove on the iron fist of domination."5 3
The figure of Woman as victim is an important one, but it is not the only
figure of the feminine. MacKinnon tells us a story, a profound story, and it is
true, but only partially so. This is the second criticism of MacKinnon's Marxist
transposition which can only understand women's "material" oppression
through the reduction of feminine sexual difference to Woman as the fuckee.
As we have seen, for MacKinnon, having a "sex," particularly a feminine
identity, cannot be separated from "having sex," and "having sex" cannot be
separated from domination and sadomasochism.
Feminism has a theory of power: sexuality is gendered as gender is
sexualized. Male and female are created through the erotization of
dominance and submission. The man/woman difference and the domi-
nance/submission dynamic define each other. This is the social meaning
of sex and the distinctly feminist account of gender inequality. Sexual
objectification, the central process within this dynamic, is at once
epistemological and political.5
The third criticism, which is primarily political, is that despite the limits
of Marxism as a "science," its emphasis on class, race, and national difference
remains extremely important to a feminism that is always modified through its
respect for difference and which continually allows new narrations of the
feminine and how it is lived, experienced, and told. As Audre Lorde has
succinctly argued:
By and large within the women's movement today, white women focus
upon their oppression as women and ignore differences of race, sexual
preference, class, and age. There is a pretense to homogeneity of experi-
ence covered by the word sisterhood that does not in fact exist.55
In other words, femininity, if it is not to fall into the erasure of race and
class difference, must always be modified. Indeed, put even more strongly, the
openness to modification through-or openness to modification by-the "other
woman" is what provides the very basis of feminism as an aspiration to an
ethical relationship irreducible to a set of established rules or any currently
accepted political slogan.
53. P. 219.
54. Pp. 113-14 (footnote omitted).
55. A. LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 116 (1984) (emphasis in original).
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VII. THE AFFIRMATION OF FEMININE SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
A. Overcoming the Repudiation of the Feminine
Politically, I can summarize my disagreement with MacKinnon as follows:
for MacKinnon, feminism must involve the repudiation of the feminine; for me,
feminism demands the affirmation of feminine sexual difference and the
challenge to women's dereliction which flows inevitably from the repudiation
of the feminine. Without this challenge, we are left with the politics of revenge
and lives of desolation, which make a mockery of the very concept of freedom.
But to understand how we can make this challenge without simply replicating
the pattern of gender hierarchy, we must first give a different account of why
a gender hierarchy cannot completely capture feminine sexual difference.
MacKinnon's own analysis of femininity does not turn on a naturalist
account of anatomy as destiny or on appeal to pre-given natural libidinal drives
as the basis of male desire and domination. She moves within accepted post-
modem insight by recognizing that femininity as imposed sexuality is a social
construction. But, social construction or not, the constitution of the world
through the male gaze as reinforced by male power totalizes itself as our social
reality. Thus, if MacKinnon clearly rejects naturalism, she nevertheless remains
a specific kind of essentialist. Under this patriarchal social reality, women's
imposed "sex" is women's "essence," her only "being."
B. The Lesson of Deconstruction
I have argued at length elsewhere that MacKinnon fails to understand the
critical lesson of deconstruction 6 The lesson is that no reality can perfectly
totalize itself because reality, including the reality of male domination, is
constituted in and through language in which institutionalized meaning can
never be fully protected from slippage and reinterpretation 7 MacKinnon
believes that a feminist theory of sexuality
must be studied in its experienced empirical existence, not just in the
texts of history (as Foucault does), in the social psyche (as Lacan does),
or in language (as Derrida does). Sexual meaning is not made only, or
56. D. CORNELL, The Feminist Alliance with Deconstruction, in D. CORNELL, BEYOND ACCoMMODA-
TION, supra note 8; Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 644, 685-89 (1990).
57. Jacques Derrida has demonstrated that, as the repressed Other, the feminine is irreducible to that
which it supposedly is designated to be, the lack that signifies woman within the Symbolic. This irreducibili-
ty of the feminine also results from what Derrida calls "logic of parergonality," by which he argues that
the very frame that designates social reality always implies "more" because our reality is necessarily
enframed. See 3. DERRIDA, THE TRUTH IN PAINTING (G. Bennington & L McLeod trans. 1987).
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even primarily, by words and in texts. It is made in social relations of
power in the world, through which process gender is also produced."8
Jacques Derrida does not argue that sexual meaning is made in and through
words and texts in the limited way MacKinnon defines them. Derrida shows
us that social reality (including the very definition of power) and "empirical"
experience cannot be separated from the meanings they are given, while
simultaneously exposing the inevitability of the limit on those meanings that
have dominated our social life. The relevance of the limit to institutionalized
meaning in this context is that it allows for the affirmation of feminine sexual
difference as other than its stabilized definitions within gender hierarchy. This,
in turn, is precisely what allows us to develop a feminist celebration of wo-
men's "sex," rather than its repudiation, as well as a feminist "perspective"
which, even under MacKinnon's own program, must be the very basis of a
feminist theory of the state.
More specifically, I argue that "seeing" and "being" can never be separat-
ed.59 This argument would, at first glance, seem to bolster MacKinnon's
argument: So we are seen, so we are. But, as Paul Ricouer has convincingly
argued, we do not "see" reality directly. Instead, we "see" through language
and, more specifically, through the metaphors in which "being" is given to
us.' "Being" for Ricoeur is itself a metaphor. This means that the "being"
of femininity can never just be described as "there."
As a result, the rule of metaphor has specific implications within the context
of feminism.61 I have argued that "feminine being" cannot be separated from
the metaphors in and through which it is figured. Metaphor as transference and
analogy always implies both the like and the not like. The definition of the
feminine, including MacKinnon's definition, is only as metaphor. Metaphor,
in turn, allows both for expansion of meaning and for reinterpretation. The
characterization can then be cemented in stone, precisely because it is designat-
ed only as metaphor. Therefore, the realization of "feminine being" as metaphor
is what allows us to reinterpret and, more importantly, to affirm the feminine
as other, and irreducibly other, to any of the definitions imposed by patriarchy.
Thus we can challenge MacKinnon's position on feminine sexuality.
For MacKinnon, as we have "seen," a feminist perspective is impossible
as anything other than the recognition of the totalization of the masculine
viewpoint. Therefore, the most we can do is to simply reverse the meaning of
58. P. 129.
59. See D. CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 8.
60. Ricouer argues that we must treat the verb "to be" as a metaphor itself and recognize in "being
as" the correlate of "seeing as." 3 P. RICOUER, TIME AND NARRATiVE 155 (1984).
61. Derrida suspects that through Woman's re-metaphorization we will once again capture women in
a new concept, one in which the very process of metaphorization will itself be erased. See generally L
DERRIDA, THE EAR OF THE OTHER: OTOBIOGRAPHY, TRANSFERENCE, TRANSLATION (C. McDonald ed., P.
Kamuf trans. 1985).
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the totality, rather than challenge it in the name of the feminine. In
MacKinnon's reality, what men see as sex, women see as rape. The problem
with this solution, as Luce Irigaray has explained, is that
if [women's] aim were simply to reverse the order of things, even
supposing this to be possible, history would repeat itself in the long run,
would revert to sameness: to phallocratism. It would leave room neither
for women's sexuality, nor for women's imagination, nor for women's
language to take (their) place. 62
The possibility of feminine desire-and let me use the beautiful French word
jouissance6---that is irreducible to being flcked by men and liking it is fore-
closed by MacKinnon's analysis.
I will return to lesbianism and love between women as an alternative
shortly. For now I am operating within MacKinnon's own heterosexual frame-
work, because given MacKinnon's analysis, that is the framework that defines
social reality. I want to emphasize that given MacKinnon's repudiation of the
feminine, there can only be the inescapable totality of male violence, the world
of the "fuckees" and the "fuckors." 4 "True love" between women is always
blocked by the totality of an imposed pornographic heterosexual reality. As a
result, the utopian vision of lesbianism developed by innumerable writers such
as Cixous, Irigaray, and Wittig, is foreclosed.65 We are left instead with a
disjuncture between sex and freedom. To quote MacKinnon:
So long as sexual inequality remains unequal and sexual, attempts to
value sexuality as women's, possessive as if women possess it, will
remain part of limiting women to it, to what women are now defined
as being. Outside of truly rare and contrapuntal glimpses (which most
people think they live almost their entire sex life within), to seek an
equal sexuality without political transformation is to seek equality under
conditions of inequality. Rejecting this, and rejecting the glorification
of settling for the best that inequality has to offer or has stimulated the
resourceful to invent, are what Ti-Grace Atkinson meant to reject when
she said: "I do not know any feminist worthy of the name who, if
forced to choose between freedom and sex, would choose sex. She'd
choose freedom every time. '66
62. L. IRIGARAY, supra note 46, at 33.
63. Jouissance is a term which, as used by Lacan, lacks direct translation. In contemporary philosoph-
ical and psychoanalytic discourse, it is often taken to refer to women's specifically feminine, total sexual
pleasure. For a more detailed and nuanced explication of this aspect, see H. CIxous & C. CLUMENT, TiE
NEWLY BORN WOMAN 88-89 (1986).
64. See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFID, supra note 6, at 60-61.
65. In The "Herethics" of Carnality, in D. CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 8, I
present a comprehensive treatment of these authors and their efforts to write of feminine desire and pleasure
differently, in a way that refuses to repudiate the feminine while it insists on believing in the woman writer
and, thus, in woman's new beginning.
66. Pp. 153-54 (quoting Atdnson, Why I'm against SIM Liberation, in AGAINST SADOMASOCISM:
A RADICAL FEMINIST ANALYSIS 91 (E. Linden, D. Pagano, D. Russel & S. Star eds. 1982)).
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Maybe. But what is the content of this freedom? More specifically, what
kind of conception of the person would we need to think that the disjuncture
between sex and freedom could lead to freedom? In fact, one central theme of
feminist philosophy has been to challenge conceptions of freedom that pit
freedom against the reality that we are beings of the flesh, and necessarily
sexual. The argument, simply put, has been that we cannot rise above our
empirical selves of the flesh in order to be free. Such a conception has been
critiqued as repression, not freedom, and has been connected to the devaluation
of women-just as women have come, in Western philosophy, to be associated
with the flesh.67 If this is women's "choice"--and choice would hardly seem
to be the right word since, under MacKinnon's analysis, it is forced upon
women-it would seem rather to be a "choice" between desolation 68 or sacri-
fice and sex, not between "freedom" and sex. The celebration of the feminine
"sex" and women's sexuality, on the other hand, suggests that our sexuality
is not represented by any of the current male fantasies of woman and sex within
patriarchy. By "having sex," then, I do not mean "getting fucked" in MacKin-
non's sense. Such a reduction obviously envisions an act perpetuated by men
upon women: the man fucks, the woman "gets fucked"--with all the negative
connotations "getting fucked" takes on within our culture of so-called hetero-
sexuality. Instead, by "sex" I mean the physical intimacy necessary for crea-
tures of the flesh. Sex is the caressing, the kissing,69 the embracing that can
bring comfort and connection to two mortal, sexual creatures clinging to one
another against the darkness and finding in one another a moment of protection
and safety. Irigaray beautifully imagines two women making love as an alterna-
tive to MacKinnon's vision of "getting fucked." As Irigaray writes,
No surface holds. No figure, line, or point remains. No ground subsists.
But no abyss, either. Depth, for us, is not a chasm. Without a solid
crust, there is no precipice. Our depth is the thickness of our body, our
all touching itself. Where top and bottom, inside and outside, in front
and behind, above and below are not separated, remote, out of touch.
Our all intermingled. Without breaks or gaps.70
67. See generally L ScHOrr, COGNITION AND EROS: A CRITIQUE OF THE KANTIAN PARADIGM (1988).
68. I am indebted to A. Collin Biddle for suggesting the word "desolation" which, to my mind, so
effectively describes women's experience of having to make this kind of "choice" about their "sex" and
sexuality.
69. Luce Irigaray offers us a beautiful and poetic description of this kissing:
Kiss me. Two lips kissing two lips: openness is ours again. Our "world." And the passage from
the inside out, from the outside in, the passage between us, is limitless. Without end. No knot
or loop, no mouth ever stops our exchanges. Between us the house has no wall, the clearing no
enclosure, language no circularity. When you kiss me, the world grows so large that the horizon
itself disappears. Are we unsatisfied? Yes, if that means we are never finished. If our pleasure
consists in moving, being moved, endlessly. Always in motion: openness is never spent nor sated.
L. IRIGARAY, supra note 46, at 210.
70. Id. at 213.
1991] 2267
The Yale Law Journal
I am not arguing that lesbianism can simply take us away from male domina-
tion. Yet even so, as Wittig has brilliantly argued, lesbianism can provide us
with a politically significant vision of a different engagement with a woman's
own body and with her lover in which a woman's "sex" is not repudiated. 71
Indeed, for Wittig, the lesbian is not a woman, precisely because a woman
traditionally defined cannot be separated from her role within heterosexuality.
Simply put, the lesbian need not engage with her "sex" from within the psycho-
sexual dynamic MacKinnon describes to live her life or explore her love.
Ironically, given MacKinnon's move to totalize her own description of hetero-
sexuality, she excludes Wittig's promise of lesbianism as a different practice
of sexuality other than to the truth of sadomasochism which MacKinnon defines
as heterosexuality.
Nor am I arguing that the practice of heterosexuality is reducible to Mac-
Kinnon's and Dworkin's view of "sex" as "intercourse" or of "intercourse" as
"getting fucked."72 Here again, we are returned to the possibilities of reinter-
pretation, even if we simultaneously recognize the institutionalization of certain
sexual practices, particularly within heterosexuality, as "normal" when they may
have nothing at all to do with women's desire. But I insist on the need to
affirm the feminine and feminine sexuality, because it is necessary to challenge
the conception of a free person as one who has been cut off from her own
sexuality. Such an affirmation allows us to avoid the tragedy into which
MacKinnon's analysis inevitably leads us.
But does this mean that she is not right to remind us at every step that,
under gender hierarchy, to use Lacan's famous phrase, "fucking [is] not work-
ing?"'73 The answer is no. I too want to emphasize the suffering women must
endure and, more specifically, expose the relationship in our society between
sexual shame and women's lives. However, the story I relate may be a narration
very different from the one MacKinnon tells.
I turn now to Lacan because his story lies at the base of how gender
hierarchy is constructed and goes beyond MacKinnon's limited vision of gender
hierarchy as only a matter of social psyche.74 My focus will be to show how
Lacan helps us to understand the devalorization of the feminine sex as the
foundation of gender inequality.
71. M. Wrro, THE LESBIAN BODY (1975).
72. See generally A. DwoRKIN, INTERCOURsE (1987).
73. L. IRIGARAY, supra note 46, at 88 (quoting J. LACAN, ENCORE, LE SMINAIRE XX (1975)).
74. For insight into Lacan's basic theories of feminine sexuality, see generally, L LACAN, FEMININE
SEXUALrY: JACQUES LACAN AND THE ICOLE FREUDIENNE (J. Mitchell & . Rose eds., J. Rose trans. 1982)
(questioning any certainty or authority in conceptions of psychic and sexual life). For a detailed explanation
of the Lacanian framework, see Cornell & Thurschwell, supra note 8, at 145-46. For Derrida's intervention
into Lacan's psychoanalytic theories, see generally L DERRIMA, supra note 57.
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C. The Lacanian Account
According to Lacan, the genesis of linguistic consciousness occurs when
the infant recognizes itself as having an identity separate from the mother,
because the mother is Other to herself or himself. The primordial moment of
separation is experienced by the infant both as a loss of unity and the gaining
of an identity. The pain of this loss results in a primary repression that simulta-
neously buries the relationship to the mother in the unconscious and catapults
the infant into the Symbolic realm to fulfill its desire for the Other. Once
projected into language, this primqry identification with the mother is experi-
enced only through the disruptive force of the unconscious. The unrepresentable
desire for the Phallic Mother is only remembered in the fantasy projection that
compensates for Her absence. So far on this account, it would seem that both
sexes suffer a primordial separation from the mother and would be marked by
this separation in the same way.
Although Lacanians maintain the difference between the penis and the
phallus (the phallus represents the lack that triggers desire in both sexes), it
remains the case in Lacan's analysis that because the penis can visibly represent
the lack, the penis can appear to stand in for the would-be neutral phallus. This
establishes the basis of the illusion that having the penis is having the phallus,
with all its attendant symbolic power. In this culture of gender hierarchy, the
male child "sees" his mother's lack, which gains significance as her castration.
Sexual difference and gender identity are based on the cultural significance
attributed to this experience of "sighting." The penis is identified with potency,
able to satisfy the mother's desire. Woman, on the other hand, is identified as
the castrated Other. If the penis, at least on the level of fantasy, is identified
with the phallus, then Woman, who lacks the penis, is also seen as lacking the
affirmative qualities associated with the phallus.
Lacan's speculative insight has been reinforced by such empirical research
as the work of Eleanor Galenson. 5 Galenson's nurseries provided the arena
for observing the actual behavior of little girls. Her studies argue that sexual
shame in girls is associated with the recognition of themselves as the castrated
Other. Galenson's work further tries to draw the connection between this early
experience of sexual shame as inherent in feminine identity and some of the
symptoms and behavioral patterns in mature women including depression,
profound feelings of inadequacy, feeling like a "fake," or fear of being "found
out" despite a record of accomplishment. One of the most significant expres-
sions of sexual shame is the denial of the value of femininity and of the value
of feminine sexual difference which is irreducible to the current cultural
trappings of femininity.
75. See, e.g., Galenson & Roiphe, supra note 9.
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It also is important to note that Lacan understands male superiority as a
"sham," meaning that it is not mandated by a person's "sex" but instead rests
on the fantasy identification that having the penis is having the phallus. This
illusion also means that the symbolic "Daddy" can always take the phallus
away and, with the phallus, the affirmative qualities associated with potency.
This fear is the basis of the designation of the male as the "wimp," beautifully
allegorized in Samuel Beckett's "Happy Days." The man crawls around on all
fours unable to face the woman:
Winnie: "What is a hog exactly? What exactly is a hog, Willie, do you
know, I can't remember. What is a hog, Willie, please!"
Willie: "Castrated male swine. Reared for slaughter."'76
The analysis of the fear of the "wimp" in no way takes away from the
cruelty and the violence of the "male swine." But it does explain this violence
and cruelty as rooted in fear and not in power, especially if one defines the
empowerment of personality as innovative capability rather than beating up the
other.77 It would be accurate under this analysis to say that pornography is
what wimps need, not what men want. Thus, I disagree with MacKinnon when
she argues that "[p]ornography permits men to have whatever they want
sexually. It is their 'truth about sex."' 78 Nonetheless, for me, pornography is
clearly an "offense."
How can we more profoundly understand pornography as an offense to
women under the story of gender hierarchy I have just developed? Pornography
reinforces the very sexual shame that, as Galenson and others have shown,
makes it difficult for women truly to find equality of capability and well-being.
We can only truly understand pornography as an offense within a context that
explains gender hierarchy as the basis of sexual shame. Pornography, in this
most basic sense, is an offense because it reflects the devalorization of women's
"sex." Pornography prevents women from feeling like equal members of the
community because it reflects their "sex" in a way that no woman can affirm.
Thus, the harm to women is understood to outweigh the claim of the man who
desires that pornography be available to him free of any restrictions, particularly
once we understand the idea that pornography is not only an offense to women,
but also an insult to men.
The insult to men is that it depicts them as having to violate women in
order to imagine having sex with them. It gives us a vision and reinforces a
view of the man as the "wimp," afraid of women and, therefore, needing to
have them in chains. Hardly a flattering picture. I distinguish insult from
76. S. BECKr, HAPPY DAYS 60 (J. Knowlson ed. 1978) (emphasis in original) (stage directions
omitted).
77. For a more thorough examination of the concept of innovative capability, see Cornell, supra note
11.
78. P. 138 (footnote omitted).
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offense because I in no way want to pretend that the insult to men imposes the
same kind of suffering as the offense to women. Nevertheless, it should be
noted. Finally, it is important to recognize that the fear of the "wimp," the fear
of losing the supposed all-powerful phallus, is so overwhelming because in the
context of gender hierarchy the worst thing that can happen to a person is to
become a "girl," or rather a "cunt."
The identification of Woman as the castrated Other explains the fear in the
"wimp" as well as the devalorization of Woman. The assumption of masculine
gender identity thus depends upon the devalorization of Woman which, in turn,
explains the repudiation of the feminine as the basis for patriarchal culture. The
result for women is that we are left in a state of dereliction, which means that
the little girl cannot positively understand her relationship to her mother and,
therefore, to her own "sex." Thus, Lacan's account of gender differentiation
into two sexes explains why the gender divide becomes a hierarchy in which
the feminine is repudiated and despised, by women as well as men. Lacan
leaves us with a world of "wimps" (men) and ghosts (women) unable to meet,
speak, touch, ally. Beckett's depiction of the male crawling on all fours and
the woman slowly sinking into the "same old shii" in Happy Days allegorizes
the Lacanian understanding of the reality of gender hierarchy. "Fucking," for
both Lacan and MacKinnon, cannot succeed because of the subjection of
women. But, if Lacan recognizes the subjection of women, he also believes that
the problem is insoluble. In response, I return to Derrida's intervention into
Lacan because he shows why the affirmation of feminine sexual difference
cannot be foreclosed by the institutionalized meanings of patriarchy.
Derrida teaches us that Lacan's own understanding of gender identity
constituted in and through the linguistic structures of the Symbolic realm-the
conventional meanings given to gender in patriarchy-can be turned against
Lacan's own political conclusions. Derrida illustrates that shifts in language,
including a shift in the definition of gender identity and the designation of the
feminine as the lack of the phallus, demonstrate that this same language cannot
be definitively stabilized. In French feminist writing and in my own recent
work, another step has been taken beyond deconstruction, to advocate the need
not only to open the space for the reevaluation of the feminine, but also to write
its celebration through re-figuration and re-metaphorization of feminine fig-
ures.
79
79. For examples of the re-figuration and re-metaphorization of feminine figures, see generally H.
CiXous & C. CLEMENT, supra note 63; L. IRIGARAY, supra note 46 (developing concept of "writing" the
feminine body); J. KRISTEVA, THE KRISTEVA READER (T. Moi ed. 1986). For my analysis, see D. CORNELL,
Feminine Writing, Metaphor and Myth, in D. CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 8.
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VIII. EQUIVALENT RIGHTS: A NEw CONTEXT FOR SEX, SEXUALITY, AND
GENDER IDENTITY
A. Challenging the "Sameness" Ideology
I now want to turn to my own program of equivalent fights to develop a
different theory of equality, which I believe can overcome the deficiency in
MacKinnon's analysis. We need a theory of equality which does not end by
reinforcing the privileging of the masculine as the norm and insisting that the
gender hierarchy must be challenged. MacKinnon has correctly and profoundly
challenged the "sameness" ideology that informs so much of the law of sex
discrimination." She explains that if we can show that women are like men,
then we can show that we have been discriminated against if and when we are
in fact like them, but are treated differently. Women continually have to
analogize their experience to men's if we want it legally recognized as unequal
treatment. For MacKinnon, "sameness" and "likeness" analysis is itself a
reflection of discrimination because it demands that women meet the male norm
without questioning why the masculine was identified as the norm in the first
place. My argument insists further that unless we recognize the value of
feminine sexual difference we cannot adequately challenge the acceptance of
the male as the human and, therefore, we cannot ultimately challenge gender
hierarchy. In other words, we need the affirmation of feminine sexual difference
if we are doctrinally to challenge the likeness analysis without reducing our
insistence on women's rights in an appeal for special privilege.
A program of equivalent rights is the legal expression of the affirmation
and valuation of sexual difference. "Equivalence" is defined in the Standard
Oxford Dictionary as "of equal value," but not of equal value because of
likeness. Equivalence does not demand that the basis of equality be likeness
to men. Such a view would once again deny that we are indeed sexuate beings
of two genres and not one species without differentiation. Equivalent rights can
then be distinguished from the dominant analysis of sex discrimination that has
been reflected in current opinions in the federal courts and in the United States
Supreme Court. Moreover, equivalent rights recognize the irreducibility of the
two genres, male and female, to one another. As Luce Irigaray has explained:
I know that some men imagine that the great day of the good-for-
everyone universal has dawned. But what universal? What new imperi-
alism is hiding behind this? And who pays the price for it? There is no
universal valid for all women and all men outside the natural economy.
Any other universal is a partial construct and, therefore, authoritarian
and unjust. The first universal to be established would be that of a




That does not mean forced sexual choices. But we are living beings,
which means sexuate beings, and our identity cannot be constructed
without a vertical and horizontal horizon that respects difference."1
The "legislation valid for both sexes as a basic element in human culture"
to which Irigaray refers, must include equivalent rights as rights, not just as
privileges needed to correct the imposed inequality of women. Equivalent rights
are not merely a means to help women become more like men in the name of
promoting one species undivided by sexual difference. Equivalent rights do not
have as their sole or even their main goal the creation of a space for women
in a male world from which we have previously been shut out. Rather, they
are designed to enable women to value the choices we make about our life and
work without shame of our "sex." MacKinnon has criticized the patriarchal
culture which imposes "forced sexual choices." Yet she fails to see that one
of these forced sexual choices is the very repudiation of the feminine. I can
suggest here how the program of equivalent rights, once it is put into the
context of sex, sexuality, and gender identity, can help further the analysis of
specific issues of doctrinal concern.
B. Equivalent Rights and Pornography
I have argued through my reading of Lacan82 and the reinforcement of his
theory in the empirical research of Eleanor Galenson that the repudiation of the
feminine and, more specifically, the reinforcement of sexual shame as the basis
of identity harms women in a very specific sense and that this harm is rein-
forced by pornography. Moreover, pornography is not the projection of all-
powerful men but, as Lacan would tell us, of the "wimps" who are afraid of
women. Ultimately, pornography amounts only to a compensatory fantasy to
make up for fear of women, the "dark continent." I in no way want to deny
that fear too often leads to cruelty. We see this in race relations as well as in
relations between the sexes. But, when MacKinnon speaks of the all-powerful
man-and of pornography as his vision and his desire-she accepts the psychi-
cal fantasy of macho compensation as truth. Who but a "wimp" would fantasize
about sex with a woman in chains, tied, bound and gagged, so he would, in the
most profound sense, not have to face her, let alone hear her?
C. Equivalent Rights and Abortion
I want to turn now to the issue of abortion. The right of abortion is a classic
example of equivalent rights for women and should be included in what
81. L. Irigaray, How to Define Sexuate Rights? (date unknown) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
82. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
1991] 2273
The Yale Law Journal
Irigaray has called the right to "motherhood" (as should such rights as materni-
ty leave and prenatal care). Without such a right women cannot aspire to
achieve the most basic sense of well-being because we are denied both control
over our reproductive capacity and the power to live pregnancy and motherhood
with joy and without sacrifice of other aspects of our lives. Men clearly do not
need the right of abortion. But that does not mean that women should not have
such a right guaranteed if we are to have equality of capability and well-being.
To understand why the right of abortion is crucial as an equivalent right, we
must understand ourselves as sexual beings whose freedom can never be
separated from an affirmative relationship to our "flesh." Such an affirmative
relationship is impossible without a right of bodily integrity. Justice Blackmun,
in his dissent in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,83 voiced his fear
of the loss of freedom to women if we were to lose this right of abortion,
which I would include under the right to bodily integrity.8 I want to stress
here the suffering imposed on women as creatures of the flesh if we lose that
right and yet find ourselves in circumstances in which we are unable to raise
and mother a baby and, therefore, must impose upon ourselves a self-inflicted
abortion. The abortion movement of the early 1970's documented just how
many women were forced to rely on such an option when abortion was illegal.
In her horrifying novel-horrifying because it depicts so brilliantly the toll of
the sexual shame of women as the basis of their identity-Torborg Nedreaas
describes the anguish, the physical anguish of a self-inflicted abortion:
Then I set to. Drops of sweat ran down the bridge of my nose, and I
noticed that I was sitting there with my tongue hanging out of my
mouth. Because something burst. I could hear it inside my head from
the soft crunch of tissues that burst. The pain ran along my spine and
radiated across my loins and stomach. I screamed. I thought I screamed,
but there wasn't a sound. More, more, push more, find another place.
It had to be wrong. And I held the very tip of the weapon between my
thumb and forefinger to find the opening to my uterus once more. It
was difficult but I thought I'd succeeded. The steel needle slid a little
heavily against something. It went far up. Then a piercing lightning of
pain through my stomach, back and brain told me it had hit something.
More, more, don't give up. Tissues burst. The sweat blinded my eyes.
I heard a long rattling groan come out of me while my hand let the
weapon do its work with deranged courage.'
83. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
84. Blackmun stated: "I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of millions of women
who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided. I fear for the integrity of, and public
esteem for, this Court. I dissent." Id. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990) (affirming constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment).
85. T. NEDREAAS, NOTHING GROWS BY MOONLIGHT 189-90 (B. Lee trans. 1987).
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Feminine flesh is not the same as masculine flesh. The right to bodily integrity
is a right necessary for both sexes under the vision of equality of capability and
well-being. But given the difference of our "sexual being," the right to bodily
integrity does not mean the same rights, but rather the guarantee of its equiva-
lent scope for both sexes. The right of abortion is most definitely necessary to
guarantee bodily integrity for women. Rights should not be based on what men
need for their well-being as sexual beings of the flesh, as if there were only
one genre of the human species.
IX. CONCLUSION
If MacKinnon ultimately repudiates the feminine, she perpetuates rather than
challenges the gender hierarchy which lies at the base of women's inequality.
If the feminist point of view is to be incorporated into the state, we must have
an account of its possibility. I have argued that such an account is possible once
we correctly understand the role of deconstruction and, beyond this, the place
of re-metaphorization and re-figuration of the feminine in reinventing and thus
affirming, sexual difference. This affirmation allows us to identify the wrongs
to women within a context of sexual shame imposed upon women by gender
hierarchy. It also allows us to challenge the idea that the human species is only
one genre and therefore that the "rights of man" give us a full conception of
rights. To argue for equivalence is not to advocate special privilege once we
value sexual difference as necessary for women's equality of capability and
well-being, and recognize sexuality itself as necessary for a creature of the flesh
to enjoy a full life.
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